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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANTS UNDERTOOK TO WARN AGAINST A LIST OF
SPECIFIC UNSAFE LIGHTING METHODS BUT DID NOT INCLUDE THE METHOD
EMPLOYED BY MR. MUIR ON THAT LIST OF UNSAFE METHODS RAISES A JURY
QUESTION AS TO THE ADEQUACY OF THE WARNING.
Page 2 0 of the Brief of W. H. Burt and Pages 12 and 13 of
the Brief of Apache rely on the following written instructions
and warnings provided to Mrs. Muir's late husband:
LIGHTING SAFETY FUSE
Step l: Make sure you can reach a safe
location after lighting with sufficient time
before initiation.
Step 2: Place sufficient stemming over the
explosive material to protect it from fusegenerated heat and sparks.
Step 3: Have a partner before lighting the
fuse. One person should light the fuse, and
the other should time and monitor the burn.
Step 4: Light the safety fuse, using a
specially designed lighter:
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Single-fuse ignition - hot wire
lighters, pull-wire lighters or thermalite
connectors.
Multiple-fuse ignition - igniter cord
with thermalite connectors.
* Always light fuse with a fuse lighter
designed for the purpose.
* Always use the "buddy system" when
lighting safety fuse - one lights the fuse,
the other times and monitors.
. . . .

* Never use matches, cigarette lighters,
cigarettes, pipes, cigars, carbide lamps, or
other unsafe means to ignite safety fuse.
The jury question is not whether or not these written
instructions were given to Mr. Muir, but whether the explosives
industry as a whole, in promulgating these instructions,
negligently omitted to warn against the use of spitter fuse as a
lighter when using explosives.
While the industry instructions warn never to use "matches,
cigarette lighters, cigarettes, pipes, cigars, carbide lamps, or
other unsafe means to ignite safety fuse," the use of spitter
fuse as a lighter is not prohibited and is conspicuously absent
from the list.
Douglas Bailey testified during Plaintiff's case in chief as
a witness who had been present at the site of the explosion
utilizing the "buddy system" who personally experienced the blast
that killed Mr. Muir and injured Mr. Bailey. He was also called
to testify as an expert blaster and was treated as such in
questioning by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants.
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The following key testimony came into evidence during the
Plaintiffs case in chief as Mr. Bailey was cross examined
concerning the above referenced instructions and warnings.
Q. And I don't see anywhere, do you,
where it says spitter fuse is an approved
lighter?
A.

It don't say it's not approved.

Q. It lists those things that are
approved, doesn't it?
A. But it don't say this is not
approved, does it?
(R. 1469)
While Mr. Bailey is obviously not an expert in the proper
grammatical use of the word "don't" in the English language, he
was treated as a blasting expert by both the Plaintiff and the
Defendants at the trial, and clearly testifies during the case in
chief that there was a failure by Defendants to warn against the
use of spitter fuse as a lighter.
Mrs. Muir's deceased husband was not an experienced blaster.
He was a baker who was using the explosives in his weekend
treasure hunting hobby activities. It is for a lay jury of his
peers to decide whether the instructions promulgated by the
explosives industry which failed to expressly warn against the
use of spitter fuse for lighting were adequate to warn and
instruct a lay person such as Mr. Muir not to use a spitter.
The absence of warning and the testimony of Mr. Bailey are
both evidence in the record that must be examined in the light
most favorable to Mrs.. Muir, and since reasonable minds could
differ and there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
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inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in
her favor, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. Steffensen
v» Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991),
affirmed, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1992); Penrod v. Carter. 727 P.2d.
199 (Utah 1987).
Furthermore, the MSHA report on the accident which was
included by Plaintiff in the record on appeal and relied upon in
establishing evidence of failure to warn remains as further
evidence requiring jury trial. Argument by Appellees that the
MSHA report should be construed as concluding that there was an
absence of respect for the explosives rather than an absence of
knowledge concerning the use of the explosives should be decided
by the jury as a question of fact, not by the court in a directed
verdict. Evidence that the MSHA inspectors may have stated
absence of respect and absence of knowledge in the alternative
must be resolved by the jury, and Mrs. Muir is entitled to have
the MSHA report of the cause of the accident that is in evidence
as Trial Exhibit 38 and that is part of the record on appeal
examined in the light most favorable to her.
The MSHA inspectors concluded that Mr. Muir lacked knowledge
of or respect for the explosives used by the way that he was
involved in lighting the charges. Contrary to the argument by
Defendants that the written instructions and warnings somehow
explicitly stated that the method used for lighting the charges
in the present case is dangerous and should not be used, there is
in fact no such explicit statement anywhere in the written
warnings and instructions admitted into evidence, there is a
conspicuous absence of any such explicit statement in the
materials admitted into evidence, and there is a genuine jury
question as to whether the instructions and warnings were
adequate and whether there was a failure to warn that the method
6

used for lighting the charges in the present case was dangerous
and should not be used.
Contrary to the argumentative assertion by Appellees that
the evidence "conclusively" established that it was respect for
explosives that Bailey and Muir lacked, not knowledge, in regard
to the evidence that the MSHA inspectors that investigated the
accident found that the "accident resulted from the total lack of
knowledge of or respect for the explosives used," (Brief of
Apache, Page 10), the evidence does not "conclusively" establish
the argumentative proposition asserted by Appellees, they fail to
cite to any evidence in the record that would support this
proposition at all, let alone "conclusively" establish it, and
this is the very kind of argument that should be made to the jury
after the matter is properly submitted to the jury rather than
being erroneously taken away from the jury by a directed verdict.
By bare argument Defendants also assert that the method used
for lighting the charges in this case was so obviously dangerous
that they somehow have no duty to warn against the use of the
spitter fuse method of lighting because is somehow obviously
dangerous.

On the contrary, the evidence shows that the spitter

fuse method of lighting had been successfully and safely used by
Mr. Muir and Mr. Bailey in this treasure trove hunting operation
in blasts prior to the blast that widowed Mrs. Muir. (Exhibit 38)
Again, because Mrs. Muir is entitled to have this evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to her, the alleged obviousness of
the danger also gives rise to a question for the jury that should
not have been taken away from the jury by way of directed
verdict.

Plaintiff's counsel put his eggs into the defective

products basket after the directed verdict removed the claim for
failure to warn, but should never have had to do so in this case
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and should have been allowed to argue failure to warn to the jury
and have the jury decide that claim.
POINT TWO
THIS CASE SHOULD BE USED AS A MODERN CASE TO HOLD THAT THE
COUNTY WHERE THE PRODUCT WAS PURCHASED IS A PROPER VENUE FOR
TRIAL IN A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT CASE.
The case of Schramm/Johnson Drug v» Cox, 9 P.2d 399 (1932)
provides that a cause of action in a defective products case
arises both in the county where the product was sold and the
county where the resulting harm occurred. Defendants do not
contest that this case has never been overruled, but try to
escape its doctrine by labelling the doctrine as dictum and
discounting the case due to its age.
The appeal now before the Court of Appeals provides an
opportunity to set forth doctrine that is clearly holding rather
than dictum in a modern case that stands for the proposition that
the county of point-of-sale is a proper venue for the trial of a
defective products case.
Defendants have provided no persuasive argument for why the
doctrine the Schramm/Johnson Drug v. Cox case should not be so
honored and reaffirmed. By opening a store in Davis County and
selling products to persons living along the Wasatch Front,
Defendant W.H. Burt intentionally benefitted from engaging in
commerce in that county and can and should reasonably be required
to appear and litigate in the courts of that county.
The argument by Defendants and the erroneous ruling by the
trial court that Davis County was not a proper venue for trial
8

should be rejected, and this Court should hold that purchasers of
allegedly defective products can sue in the courts of the county
where they purchased the product, which is consistent with
Schramm/Johnson v. Cox, supra.
POINT THREE
IT IS NOT GENUINELY DISPUTED THAT MRS. MUIR'S FAMILY
PHYSICIAN GAVE A PROFESSIONAL OPINION THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TRAVEL
TO MOAB, AND IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
MAKE A MEDICAL JUDGMENT CONTRARY TO THAT OF MRS. MUIR'S OWN
FAMILY PHYSICIAN WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE OR HOLDING A HEARING.
Since the advent of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the
appellate and trial courts in Utah routinely include with their
notices instructions that persons with special physical needs
should contact the ourt in advance.
In this case, Evelyn Muir notified the trial court that she
would not be able to attend trial in Moab, and even provided to
the trial court a letter from her family physician, a copy of
which is annexed hereto, in which the physician states that it is
his "professional opinion that Evelyn Muir should not travel to
Moab" and that he "would strongly recommend that she stay in Salt
Lake City" by way of this same letter which was addressed to her
counsel and provided to the trial court.
It is undisputed that this letter was provided to the trial
court well in advance of trial and that Mrs. Muir informed the
trial court, through counsel, that she would be unable to attend
the trial as scheduled in Moab. It is further undisputed that
the trial court denied her request that venue be changed to Davis
County based on a conclusion of law that Davis County was not a
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proper venue for trial, a legal conclusion challenged as being
erroneous in Point Two above.
A trial court does not have the discretion to incorrectly
apply the law. The Court of Appeals should reaffirm the
Schramm/Johnson v, Cox case as set forth in Point Two above, and
having done so, should further hold that the undisputed fact that
Evelyn Muir timely notified the trial court that she was
physically unable to attend the trial of her own case, provided
the trial court with a letter from her family physician to that
effect, and was then not present at trial, is sufficient to
establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
The notifications as sent out by trial and appellate courts
under the Americans With Disabilities Act to the effect that
persons with physical needs should notify the courts in advance
of hearings ought not to be turned into a tool for tactical
adversarial litigation aimed at preventing litigants from
attending the trials of their own cases.
Nothing more was required of Evelyn Muir and nothing more
should be required of litigants in the future who in good faith
notify trial and appellate courts of special physical needs as
they are invited to do under the Americans With Disabilities Act
notification routinely sent with notices of trial and appellate
courts of this state. If a Court is going to require more,
notice and an opportunity to be heard should first be provided
and evidence should be taken. It was an abuse of discretion to
require more without providing notice and opportunity to provide
more and to make a medical judgment without setting a hearing and
taking evidence.
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CONCLUSION
This case should be reversed and remanded with a mandate to
change venue to Davis County for a jury trial on all three claims
for relief.
DATED this

/o

day of Ap

MAILING CERTIFICATE

/o

[5, I did mail true and correct
REPLY^BSJEF to Roger P.
Suite 510, Salt Lake City,
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On this
day of April,
copies of the foregoing APPEK
Christensen at 175 So, West T
Utah 84101 and Shawn Draney
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ADDENDUM

A

52& South 300 Wert #203

PaniftyPhysldan
Mumy, Uuh $4107

Idcphone (801) MM881

09/21/93
Robert Copier
243 B.-400 S.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

It is my professional opinion that Evelyn Muir should not travel to Moab
as she will not be able to maintain the diet that 1 have suited with ber and
the additional stress will also complicate her already fragile medical
condition. She is very underweight and has lost 50 pounds in the last 2 and
l/!2 years due to continual diarrhea. Requiring her to live in a motel and eat
in testaurants in Moab will increase her stress and will probably worsen her
condition. If there is any way to avoid this change I would strongly
recommend that she stay in Salt Lake City.
Sincerely,
Dennis D Harper, D.O.
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